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The Effective Use of Postacquisition Evidence
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act
INTRODUCTION

Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits corporate acquisitions
which may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.' The Act demands that the probable' economic consequences of an acquisition be measured at the "time of suit."3 Because suit may be brought at any time the acquisition threatens to
violate the Act, many years may elapse between the acquisition
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, reads as follows:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
For overviews of § 7 see S. KANwrr, 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION §§ 17.01 et. seq. (1980);
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 197-216 (1977). See generally Dougherty, Case Against Bigness: Politics, Power and Technological Inertia, 11 Axrrrausr L. &
ECON. REV. 41 (1979); Kaplan, Potential Competition and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 25
ANTITRUST BULL. 297 (1980); Lurie, Mergers Under the Burger Court: An Anti-Antitrust
Bias and Its Implications, 23 VILL. L. REV. 213 (1978); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 243 (1975); Withered, Reciprocity, Monopsony Power,
and Section 7, 25 ANTITRUST BULL.217 (1980); NOa, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1952).
2. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957). The
probability standard is distinct from "mere possibility" or "certainty." Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
3. 353 U.S. at 607. The impact is measured at the time of suit, rather than at the time of
acquisition. The du Pont "time of suit" rule has been modified to the time of trial. United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 505 (1974). The terms are used interchangeably. This article will use the term "time of suit" to encompass both meanings. For a
discussion of the significance of the shift to the time of trial, see Comment, The Treatment
of PostacquisitionEvidence under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Significance of the Reference Point in Predicting the Effect of a Merger on Competition, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 814
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, PostacquisitionReference Point]. See generally Orrick, The Clayton Act: Then and Now, 24 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 44 (1964); Subcommittee on Section 7, The Backward Sweep Theory and the Oligopoly Problem, 32 ABA ANTRUST L.J. 306 (1966).
4. In order to accomplish the objective of § 7 "to nip monopoly in the bud" the Government may bring suit "at any time the acquisition threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect." Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3rd Cir. 1953).
Actions for damages under § 7 are, however, subject to a four year statute of limitations.
15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976). This provision does not apply to equitable proceedings. Intl. Tel. &
1.
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and the trial.' Evidence of events occurring after the acquisition is
admissable. The outcome of the trial may well be influenced by the
weight accorded the postacquisition evidence.'
In exceptional circumstances, a section 7 defendant may rely on
postacquisition evidence to show a lack of probable anticompetitive effect.' In most cases, however, such evidence is entitled to
little weight." Several problems presented by excessive reliance on
postacquisition evidence have led to the formulation of this rule.
The most commonly cited problem is that defendants could avoid

liability by temporarily refraining from conduct which would reTel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 296 F. Supp. 920 (D.C. Haw. 1969).
5. An extreme example is found in the case that announced the time of suit rule, United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). Between 1917 and 1919 du
Pont purchased 23% of the stock of General Motors. The Government did not bring suit
until 1949 and the Supreme Court decision invalidating the acquisition was not announced
until 1957. See notes 14-18 infra and accompanying text.
6. For discussions of postacquisition evidence, see Note, Antitrust Law - United States
v. General Dynamics: Toward an Analytical Approach to Post-Acquisition Evidence, 53 N.
CAR. L. Rev. 535 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Analytical Approach to Post-Acquisition
Evidence]; Note, Antitrust - Post-Acquisition Evidence and Conglomerate Mergers, 46 N.
CA& L. Rzv. 366 (1968); Note, PostacquisitionEvidence and Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
A Study in JudicialLegislation,36 U. CIN. L. REv. 434 (1967). See also Horowitz, A Bayesian View of Post-Acquisition Evidence and Antitrust, 22 AwrmusT BuLL. 757 (1977):
Comment, PostacquisitionReference Point, supra note 3.
Postacquisition evidence is an "evidence" topic only to the extent that it involves the
possibility of manufactured evidence. See note 9 infra. The real issue is the appropriate
weight to be accorded postacquisition evidence in various circumstances. As always, however, general relevance principles provide a basis for exclusion should the potential for
prejudice outweigh the probative value of the evidence. FED. R. Evm. 403.
7. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 506-08 (1974) discussed
at notes 30-42, 109-110 infra and accompanying text. See also Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603
F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979), discussed at notes 116-117 infra and accompanying text; United
States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977), discussed at notes 103108 infra and accompanying text; United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp.
1271 (W.D. Pa. 1977), discussed at text accompanying notes 113-115 infra; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York, 93 F.T.C. 110 (1979), discussed at notes 94-99 infra and accompanying text; United Brands Co., 83 F.T.C. 1614 (1974), discussed at notes 78-82 infra. These
cases illustrate that even when not controlling, such postacquisition evidence may be used
with some effectiveness.
8. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); Ash
Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978);
Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 246 (1978); Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 89 F.T.C. 557 (1977),
remanded, 589 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1979); Liggett & Myers, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1074 (1976), affd,
567 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1977). But see United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486 (1974) (when the basis for limiting the weight of postacquisition evidence does not apply, it can be given controlling weight in rebutting a prima facie case); Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. of New York, 93 F.T.C. 110 (1979); United Brands Co., 83 F.T.C. 1614 (1973). See generally Note, Analytical Approach to Post-Acquisition Evidence, supra note 6.
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veal the anticompetitive impact of the acquisition. 9 In addition,
whether or not the defendant conceals the anticompetitive impact

of a merger, the fact that there has not yet been a substantial lessening of competition at the time of trial does not mean that none
will occur in the future. 10 Moreover, a showing that the postmerger market is no less competitive than the pre-merger market

is deceptive. The real issue is whether the post-merger market is
less competitive than it would have been had the merger never occurred." Finally, as a matter of policy, the section 7 goal to "nip
monopoly in the bud"' 2 would be frustrated if defendants were
given a "free trial period" until anticompetitive effects became
manifest.' For these reasons, postacquisition evidence introduced
to show that there has been no anticompetitive effect has traditionally been given little weight.
This article will set forth an historical perspective of the uses of
postacquisition evidence. Particular consideration will be given to
circumstances that may justify reliance upon postacquisition evidence. In addition, this article will evaluate the effectiveness of
postacquisition evidence which demonstrates actual impact upon

9.

United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 504-05 (1974).
[A] respondent, so long as the merger is the subject to an investigation or proceeding, may deliberately refrain from anticompetitive conduct - may sheathe, as it
were, the market power conferred by the merger - and build, instead, a record of
good behavior to be used in rebuttal in the proceeding. One consequence of a
receptive attitude toward post-acquisition evidence on the part of the tribunals
deciding Section 7 cases is that there will be frequent remands for further such
evidence, as the instant case illustrates, until eventually, the proceeding may become so protracted as to preclude effective relief, or may terminate in the respondent's favor only because his good-conduct evidence has been persuasive. At that
point, the respondent is free to take the wraps off the market power conferred by
the merger.
The Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1559 (1963), afl'd, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
The problem is similar to that raised by self-serving statements. See generally 1 S.GARD,
JONES ON EVIDENCE

§ 4:61 (6th ed. 1972). In a sense, postacquisition evidence subject to

manipulation by a defendant and self-serving statements both involve the possibility of
,'manufactured evidence" and must be evaluated carefully before they are accorded any
weight. See generally Note, Analytical Approach to Post-Acquisition Evidence, supra note
6.
10. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 505 (1974). Of course, should
anticompetitive effects manifest themselves at a later date, du Pont would allow the merger
to be challenged at that time. See notes 4 and 5 supra. Such a challenge would provide an
inadequate remedy, however, because it would not achieve the § 7 goal of stopping anti-.
competitive effects in their incipiency. Id.
11. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965).
12. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3rd Cir. 1953).
13. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965).
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competition, a defendant's anticompetitive power, or post-merger
market changes.
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Time of Suit Doctrine
The rule that the probability of an acquisition's anticompetitive

effect is to be assessed as of the time of suit 1 4 provides the basis for

the use of postacquisition evidence. 15 If the probability of an acquisition's anticompetitive effect were measured as of the time of
the merger itself, evidence of subsequent events would be irrelevant. Under the time of suit doctrine, however, postacquisition evidence is relevant because an assessment of probable effect on competition is measured as of the time the antitrust suit is brought.
This rule was first announced in United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co."6 In du Pont, the fact that the defendant pur14. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). See notes 3
supra.
15. The value of postacquisition evidence has been the subject of considerable debate.
Justice Harlan maintained that "[t]he value of post-merger evidence seems more than offset
by the difficulties encountered in obtaining it." FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,
593 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Others have expressed concern for the ability of businesses to predict the legality of their
actions. Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1203 (1962), rev'd, 386 U.S. 568 (1967). One commentator offers a reply to this concern:
While there is much to be said for the proposition that parties ought to be able to
determine the legality of their moves once and for all at the time that they make
them, it is also apparent that the public can benefit by requiring a later divestiture of partial stock interests when they result in substantial foreclosures. However, if this latter proposition is adopted, the Government should be required to
prove that there was a purpose and an intent to use the stock interest to secure an
undue advantage.
Bromley, Business' View of the DuPont-GeneralMotors Decision, 46 Gzo. L.J. 646, 651
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Bromley].
Some feel that a causal connection between the merger and the postacquisition evidence
should be required before postacquisition evidence is considered. See Note, Postacquisition
Evidence and Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Study in Judicial Legislation, 36 U. CN. L.
Rsy. 434 (1967). See also United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 625 (1957) (Burton, J., dissenting);
General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968);
Ekco Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965); Reynolds' Metal Co. v. FTC, 309
F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The current state of the law clearly requires no such causal connection. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 485 (1974), at notes 30-42,
109-110 infra and accompanying text.
Others consider postacquisition evidence the best evidence available. "Without postacquisition evidence, the trier is faced with a blank slate and untested speculation." FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 606 (1965) (Stewart, J., concurring).
16. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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posely employed its General Motors stock to improve its position
as a supplier of products to General Motors"7 was found probative
of whether its position as primary supplier to GM was an anticom-

petitive effect of the stock acquisition, or was attributable solely to
du Pont's competitive merit.18 This case firmly established that,
under the time of suit doctrine, postacquisition evidence may be
valuable in assessing a merger's probable impact on competition.
PostacquisitionEvidence Used to Challenge and to Defend
Thegovernment 1 9 has traditionally been successful in relying on
postacquisition evidence to show probable anticompetitive effects."0 In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1 for
instance, the Supreme Court permitted the government to rely
upon postacquisition evidence to bolster its prima facie case. Postacquisition evidence showing anticompetitive power resulting from

a merger and a defendant's willingness to exercise that power is
reliable because the evidence clearly demonstrates a probability of

anticompetitive effect. Furthermore, such evidence is not within
the government's control and thus not subject to manipulation.
With regard to defensive use of postacquisition evidence, however, the Supreme Court has consistently reversed lower court
opinions that relied too heavily upon postacquisition evidence of-

fered by a defendant. In 1964, the Court reversed a district court
opinion which placed heavy reliance on the postacquisition management policies introduced as evidence that the status quo had
17. Id. at 606. The Court has been criticized for this interpretation of the evidence:
I believe that industry generally resents that . . . the Court should have overturned unequivocal findings of the district court to the effect (1) that du Pont was
a principal General Motors' supplier long before any stock purchase, (2) that du
Pont maintained this position as a supplier for years following its stock purchase,
and (3) that for the entire thirty years preceding the suit purchases by General
Motors of du Pont products were based solely on the competitive merits of those
products.
Bromley, supra note 15, at 646.
18. 353 U.S. at 605-06.
19. Most of the reported cases dealing with postacquisition evidence have been brought
by the government. This article will specify if the plaintiff is not the government.
20. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 927 (1980); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 919 (1968); Ekco Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d
800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962); United States v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 246 (1978).
21. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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been maintained.2 2 The following year the Court reversed a decision that relied upon the acquired company's fall in market share
and relative lack of success in reciprocal buying.23 Finally, the
Court again reversed a court of appeals decision that had upheld a
merger after finding no evidence of anticompetitive impact.2 ' In
these cases, the Supreme Court made it clear that there is no requirement that anticompetitive power manifest itself in anticompetitive action before a violation of section 7 occurs.25 For some
time after du Pont permitted consideration of postacquisition evidence in determining probable anticompetitive effects, it appeared
as though such evidence always worked against, and never in favor
of, a section 7 defendant. 6
Nonetheless, in exceptional circumstances postacquisition evidence may successfully negate the probability of anticompetitive
impact. For example, evidence that after the merger the defendant
does not have the power to engage in anticompetitive activities is
22. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). The Court noted that the
defendant was under pressure because of the pending antitrust suit. Id. at 463. The Court
found that the acquiring can manufacturer and the acquired glass container manufacturer
"were set off directly against one another in this [competitive] process and that the merger
therefore carries with it the probability of foreclosing actual and potential competition between these two concerns." Id. In light of the acquiring can manufacturer's power to guide
the acquired glass container manufacturer's development consistently with the former's interest in metal containers, the merger was in violation of § 7, regardless of postacquisition
management policies. Id.
23. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). See notes 46-52 infra and
accompanying text.
24. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). See notes 53-55 infra and accompanying text.
25. Id.
26. The unfairness of this situation was noted by the majority in General Dynamics:
In the context of the present case the 'time of suit' rule coupled with the limited
weight given to post-merger evidence of no anticompetitive impact tends to give
the Government a 'heads-I-win, tails-you-lose' advantage over a § 7 defendant;
post-merger evidence showing a lessening of competition may constitute an 'incipiency' on which to base a divestiture suit, but evidence showing that such lessening has not, in fact, occurred cannot be accorded 'too much weight.'
415 U.S. at 505 n.13. One commentator interpreted this passage as an indication that "the
majority viewed the determination of the weight to be given post-acquisition evidence solely
as a question of fair play." Lurie, Mergers Under the Burger Court:An Anti-Antitrust Bias
and Its Implications, 23 VIL. L. Rzv. 213, 248 (1978).
The courts' reluctance to give much weight to postacquisition evidence offered by a defendant may be a reflection of the antitrust trends of the time. In 1966 Justice Stewart
reflected that the "sole consistency.., in litigation under § 7 [is that] the Government
always wins." United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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highly probative.2 7 In addition, defendants can rely on evidence
showing that the pre-merger market has changed, and that the nature of the post-merger market prevents the merger from having
an anticompetitive impact.2 8
The United States v.
General Dynamics Corp. Decision
Defense reliance upon evidence showing a change in the dynamics of the market presents few of the problems typically associated
with the use of postacquisition evidence. Generally, changes in the
nature of the entire market are not susceptible to manipulation by
the defendant.2 9 Furthermore, this evidence presumably relates to
the probable effect on competition, as opposed to the actual impact.3 0 Finally, it does not frustrate the section 7 policy of stopping
anticompetitive mergers in their incipiency since it does not give
the defendant a "free trial period." 1
In United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,"' the Supreme
Court made it clear that when the usual problems" associated with
postacquisition evidence are not present, and when postacquisition
evidence negates the probability of a lessening of competition, it
can be given controlling weight.' In that case, the defendant
proved postacquisition changes in the pattern and structure of the
coal industry, as well as a dramatic decrease in the acquired company's reserve supply of coal." Specifically, while the coal industry
had become dominated by long-term requirements contracts, the
acquired company's uncommitted coal reserves had dwindled."
The cumulative effect of these changes was to prevent the company from effectively competing for future contracts.
The Court noted the traditional reasons for limiting the weight
27. See notes 62-64 infra and accompanying text.
28. See notes 29-42 and 58-103 infra and text accompanying.
29. One exception may be markets which are dominated by the defendant, so as to enable the simulation of market changes.
30. This consideration is discussed more fully at notes 43-56 infra and accompanying
text.
31. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965).
32. 415 U.S. 486 (1974). See generally Knapp, General Dynamics - Mirage or Oasis?, 26
MERCER L. REv. 577 (1975); Moyes, United States v. General Dynamics Corporation:An
Interpretation,20 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1975).
33. See notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
34. 415 U.S. at 504-06.
35. Id. at 506.
36. Id. The changes in the market had made substantial uncommitted reserves essential
to competition for future contacts.
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given postacquisition evidence, but found that in this case they did
not apply. First, the evidence was not susceptible to manipulation
by the defendant.3 7 Second, the demonstration of weak coal
reserves was not merely evidence that no lessening of competition
had yet occurred. It necessarily implied that the acquired company
was not merely disinclined but was unable to compete effectively
for future contracts. 8 Finally, because the market changes were
the product of inevitable pressures on the coal industry,3 9 it could
not reasonably be thought that competition might have been more
active had the acquisition never occurred.40
In General Dynamics, the reasons for according postacquisition
evidence little weight were not applicable and the evidence was
probative of the acquisition's future impact on competition. 4' The
Supreme Court thus relied on the postacquisition evidence proffered by the defendant to validate the acquisition which otherwise
would have been found to violate section 7.4i Yet, the Court specifically recognized and addressed the reasons why such postacquisition evidence has traditionally been given little weight in assessing
future anticompetitive effect. In so doing, the Court implied that
in the usual case these concerns will continue to limit the weight
accorded postacquisition evidence offered by a defendant.
ACTUAL EFFECT OR PROBABLE EFFECT?

The Clayton Act proscribes mergers which carry a probability of

37. "[The evidence] could not reflect a positive decision on the part of the merged companies to deliberately but temporarily refrain from anti-competitive actions." Id.
38. Id.
39. Justice Douglas, dissenting, pointed out that much of the reduction in the acquired's
uncommitted coal reserves resulted from contractual commitments made after the acquisition. Id. at 524 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Thus, some of the crucial evidence was within the
control of the defendant (although it had been contractually removed from the defendant's
control by the time of suit.) For a similar situation, see United States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977), discussed at notes 103-108 supra and accompanying
text.
40. 415 U.S. at 506.
41. The Court indicated that the government's statistical showing "would.. . have sufficed to support a finding of 'undue concentration' in the absence of other considerations. . . ." Id. at 498. The market was already concentrated and the merger at issue significantly increased the market share of the merged company. Id. at 495-96. It is thus clear
that, absent the postacquisition changes, the acquisition would have violated § 7.
42. Id. Justice Douglas, dissenting, found the evidence much less probative, pointing out
that the district court made no finding regarding the availability of new reserves at the time
of the acquisition or the time when the complaint was filed. Douglas also noted that other
coal companies acquired new reserves after the acquisition. Id. at 524 (Douglas, J.,

dissenting).
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substantially lessening competition.48 Since section 7 was designed
to stop anticompetitive effects in their incipiency,"" mergers can be
challenged before any actual anticompetitive effect has occurred. 45
Defendants have, however, attempted to use postacquisition evidence to demonstrate not only that there is no probability that the
merger will have a future anticompetitive effect, but also that the
merger has not in fact had an anticompetitive impact.
Postacquisition evidence of a merger's actual impact on competition was relied upon by the defendant in FTC v. Consolidated
Foods.4" The defendant claimed that this evidence showed the absence of anticompetitive power 47 and the improbability of future
anticompetitive effect. The evidence presented by the defendant
was that Consolidated's attempts to establish reciprocal buying
programs"' had been relatively unsuccessful. Its effort to turn this
postacquisition evidence into an effective defensive tool failed.
First, the evidence was ambiguous. It could also be interpreted, as
the Federal Trade Commission argued, as proof that Consolidated
did have anticompetitive reciprocal buying power and the willingness to exercise that power. 49 Second, many of the traditional reasons for according postacquisition evidence little weight applied.
As a result, the Court refused to rely on the postacquisition evidence in support of the defendant's position. 50 The Court recognized that to do otherwise would be to permit the parties to simply
bide their time until reciprocity was allowed to fully develop and
succeed.5 1 The Court also noted that even if the post-merger market were actually no less competitive than the pre-merger market,
it was impossible to know whether the post-merger market might
not have been even more competitive had the merger never

43. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
44. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3rd Cir. 1953).
45. See notes 53:55 infra and text accompanying.
46. 380 U.S. 592 (1965). This case is also discussed at notes 84-93 infra and accompanying text. See also text accompanying note 23 supra.
47. See notes 84-93 infra and accompanying text.
48. Reciprocal buying involves an arrangement between two firms that each will buy the
products of the other. Conglomerates, by virtue of their large volume of purchasing, may be
able to pressure other companies into reciprocal buying arrangements by threatening to
cease purchasing the other companies' products. See generally authorities cited in note 83
infra.
49. See notes 84-93 infra and text accompanying.
50. In contrast, the Court did rely on postacquisition evidence supporting the government's position. See note 88 infra and accompanying text.
51. 380 U.S. at 598.
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occurred."2
The Supreme Court again addressed the absence of actual anticompetitive impact in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.53 In that

case, the court of appeals relied heavily upon postacquisition evidence introduced by the defendant. This evidence showed that
competitors of the acquired company were selling larger quantities
of bleach than before the merger, and that the acquired company's
market share had not significantly increased." The court of appeals concluded that the evidence had not proved anticompetitive
effects. The Supreme Court reversed, finding "no requirement that
the anticompetitive power manifest itself in anticompetitive action
before [section] 7 can be called into play."55
It is clear then, that postacquisition evidence of actual anticompetitive effect is not a prerequisite to proving a section 7 violation.
Moreover, evidence of the absence of anticompetitive impact is
viewed as not compelling and is accorded little, if any, weight. The
danger is that postacquisition evidence showing no actual anticompetitive effect might disguise an acquisition with an aura of harmlessness. This would allow the evidence of no actual anticompetitive effect "to override all probabilities" ' of future anticompetitive
effect. Yet, it may be that, as in Consolidated Foods, postacquisition evidence offered to show that a defendant does not have anticompetitive power will also reflect the absence of any anticompetitive impact. Therefore, the rule that postacquisition evidence be
given only limited weight must be observed even when postacquisition evidence is offered by a defendant to negate its power and
willingness to use an acquisition for anticompetitive purposes.
APPLICATIONS OF POSTACQUISITION EVIDENCE

The often limited weight of postacquisition evidence has not
prevented its application in certain contexts. 57 Postacquisition evidence has been instrumental in evaluating a section 7 defendant's
52. Id. These problems were identified in response to the court of appeals' interpretation
of the evidence as showing no anticompetitive impact. The court of appeals noted that
"[p]robability can best be guaged by what the past has taught." 329 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.
1964).
53. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
54. Id. at 576.
55. Id. at 577. The Court also noted that the increased quantity of competitors' sales was
irrelevant in light of the acquired company's increased market share. Id. at 579.
56. FTC v. Consolidated Foods, 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965).
57. The probative value of postacquisition evidence, like any other evidence, is largely
determined by the context in which it is presented.
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anticompetitive power and willingness to exercise that power. It
has also served as an indicator of post-merger changes in the nature of the market.
Evaluating a Defendant's Anticompetitive Power
Vertical Mergers
When two separate companies interacting vertically as supplier
and purchaser merge into one entity competitors of each of those
companies may be foreclosed from trading with the other company.58 In the area of vertical mergers, anticompetitive power is
likely to be manifested as the power to so foreclose. In United
States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,59 postacquisition evidence showed
that the merger of a paper manufacturer and a paper merchant
gave the parent company the power to control the acquired company's distribution. It also showed that this power was exercised to
increase distribution of the parent company's product."e The district court relied, inter alia, upon this postacquisition evidence and
the trend toward vertical mergers in the industry in finding a
probability that the merger would lessen competition."'
Another district court decision, United States v. Hammermill
Paper Co., 6 2 which also involved a merger between a paper manufacturer and paper merchant, provides an instructive comparison.
In Hammermill, the postacquisition evidence concerning foreclosure was favorable to the defendant. Although the same potential
for foreclosure existed, postacquisition evidence showed that foreclosure had not occurred. The acquiring and acquired companies
maintained separate profit centers" and manifested no intention
to attempt foreclosure." The court stated that the defendant's preacquisition motives were defensive, and relied upon postaquisition
58. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THs LAw OF AmlmusT §§ 210-212 (1977).
Some commentators have contested this theory of foreclosure. See Dean and Gustus, Vertical Integration and Section 7, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 672, 702 (1965); Hale, Vertical Integration, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 921, 938 (1949).
On vertical mergers see generally, A. Aus_N, A1TrrRus. LAW, ECONOMICS, POLICY §§
11.1-11.10 (1976).
59.

264 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1967).

60. Id. at 460.
61. Id. at 460-61.
62. 429 F. Supp. 1271 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
63. But see discussion identifying market shares not subject to foreclosure, Id. at 128385. The concept of separate profit centers is discussed in Geneen, Coricepts of a Conglomerate or a Multi-Market Company: A Businessman's View, 39 ANmrr usT L.J. 4, 13 (1969).
64. 429 F. Supp. at 1289-91.
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evidence to the extent that it did not disprove this finding. Although other aspects of the case were also important, the postacquisition evidence indicating that Hammermill did not intend to
foreclose played a role in the court's finding that the merger did
not violate section 7. Hammermill and Kimberly-Clark suggest,
then, that the outcome of a section 7 challenge may be influenced
in either direction by postacquisition evidence indicating whether
the defendant has the power and willingness to foreclose.
Conglomerate mergers
1. Power of a "Deep Pocket"
In the context of conglomerate mergers, the power to substantially lessen competition often results from introducing the "deep
pocket"" of a wealthy parent company into an industry populated
by smaller companies. This concept was discussed in Ekco Products Co. v. FTC." In that case, a large manufacturing company
acquired a smaller company that had a virtual monopoly in its
field. The Federal Trade Commission argued that the merger
would probably lessen competition, pointing to the parent company's ability to entrench the acquired company by purchasing
new competitors as they entered the market. 7 The parent company's power and intent to do so were confirmed by postacquisition evidence that the parent company acquired one new entrant
and had attempted to acquire another.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the
purchase of a virtual monopolist by a large corporation does not, in
and of itself, constitute a violation of section 7." Such a purchase,
however, in conjunction with the postacquisition evidence of attempted entrenchment, was sufficient to support the conclusion
that the merger would probably preserve the acquired company's
monopoly position. 69 Thus, the postacquisition evidence showing
65. See generally 16B J. VON KALiNOWSU, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS §
19.02[11] (6th ed. 1979); Bauer, Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act: Today's Laws and Tomorrow's Legislation, 58 B.U.L. REv. 199 (1978); Turner,
Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 Hasv. L. REv. 1313 (1965).
66. 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
67. The power to purchase competitors was not within the resources of the acquired
company. Id. at 752.
68. Id. at 751.
69. Id. at 752. The court also found that the acquiring company was itself a potential
entrant into the acquired company's field of industry. Id.
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an exercise of power7 0 to substantially lessen competition was important in proving the section 7 violation.
Similarly, in General Food Corp. v. FTC,71 the Federal Trade
Commission successfully relied upon postacquisition evidence to
show that the merged company had used its "deep pocket." The

evidence showed that General Foods had engaged in an anticompetitive advertising campaign that raised barriers to entry and triggered the merger of its major competitor.7 2 In so doing, the parent
company had demonstrated its power to upset the competitive balance and its willingness to exercise that power.73 Likewise, in
Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC7 4 the power of the "deep pocket" or
"rich parent" created the power to sell at prices approximating

cost or below and to undercut the less affluent competition.7 5 Postacquisition evidence showed that the defendant had in fact exercised its "deep pocket" power to cut prices, increasing its own sales
at the expense of its smaller competitors.7
In contrast, the anticompetitive power inherent in the "deep
pocket" of a wealthy parent company, in the absence of postacquisition evidence of efforts to exercise that power, may not be sufficient to trigger a finding of probable anticompetitive effect.77 In In
re United Brands Co.,7 8 a wealthy concern entered the lettuce industry by acquiring several small, independent lettuce growers. At

70. The evidence can also be viewed as a showing of actual, present anticompetitive
effect.
71. 386 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
72. The defendant argued that the postacquisition evidence reflected strong competition.
Id. at 946. Thus, the interpretation of the evidence was crucial in this case. See also FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), discussed infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
73. This evidence could also be viewed as a demonstration of actual lessening of
competition.
74. 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
75. Id. at 229-30. Reynolds actually involved a vertical merger between an aluminum
manufacturer and a company in the business of converting aluminum foil into decorative
florist foil. The court's analysis, however, focused on the "deep pocket" effect rather than
the vertical aspects of the merger.
76. Id. at 230. The court noted the Commission's finding that this conduct had an actual
anticompetitive effect. At the same time, the court recognized that "[t]he Commission is not
required to establish that the Reynolds' acquisition of Arrow did in fact have anticompetitive consequences. It is sufficient if the Commission shows the acquisition had the
capacity or potentiality to lessen competition." Id.
77. Whether postacquisition evidence of efforts to exercise anticompetitive power should
be required in order to trigger a Section 7 violation is essentially a policy question, ouside
the scope of this article.
78. 83 F.T.C. 1614 (1974).
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the time of the acquisition the industry was composed predominately of highly competitive small businesses. Although postacquisition evidence showed that the parent company gave financial assistance to the acquired company, helping it survive heavy losses,
the evidence did not show any predatory pricing. Notably, in upholding the merger the Federal Trade Commission found it necessary to place considerable emphasis on this postacquisition evidence, because the probable effects of the acquisition seemed so
uncertain.7 ' The Commission found that although the respondent
had used its "deep pocket" to help the acquired company, the ability to sustain large losses does not, in itself, pose a threat to competition."0 The Commission distinguished the mere ability to survive heavy losses from "the ability to incur losses which others
cannot incur, coupled with a predatory pricing scheme.
Apparently, additional
postacquisition evidence of this sort would
have been significant.8 "
79. Id. at 1703. Absent actual anticompetitive impact, conglomerate mergers do not lend
themselves to certainty of evaluation of anticompetitive effects. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581-91 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally S. KANWrr, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT § 17.03 (1980); Note, Antitrust - Post-Acquisition.Evidence and Conglomerate Mergers, 46 N. CAR. L. REv. 366 (1968).
80. 83 F.T.C. at 1703.
81. Id. at 1703 n.8.
82. Similarly, the Commission did not find the unrealized potential for preferential
prices significant, without more. Id. at 1703-04.
United Brands also involved other postacquisition evidence. The Commission reviewed
the respondent's discontinued attempt to establish an anticompetitive brand differentiation
program:
Its plan was simply to get control of enough lettuce acreage to permit it to "subdue" the short-run forces of supply and demand, i.e., to acquire "some degree of
control over the market and prices ... ." The appearance of product superiority
that would be needed to justify the "premium" prices it proposed to charge was to
be acquired in the straight-forward fashion of simply separating the regular yield
from its farms into two parts. The best of the crop would be packaged and sold as
"Chiquita" brand lettuce at the 30 percent to 50 percent higher price. The rest of
the crop would be left unpackaged and sold at the going market price, the one
received by its competitors for their total lettuce crop. Respondent's average
price, in other words, would be substantially higher than its competitors' prices
although its average quality would admittedly be no better than theirs.
Id. at 1963. (Thompson, Comm'r., concurring) (footnote omitted).
The Commission rejected the administrative law judge's suggestion that the postacquisition withdrawal of the program be viewed with skepticism, since its timing coincided with
the Commission's investigation. Id. at 1711. Instead it looked at other evidence, including
postacquisition evidence, concluding that "there appear to be numerous market factors
which contributed to the program's failure." Id. at 1711-12. In addition, insufficient quantities of raw product prevented respondent from providing a sufficiently steady supply and
high volume of high quality lettuce to make the program successful. Id. at 1713. In short,
although the respondent intended to use the mergers anticompetitively, because the evi-
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2.

Power to Engage in Reciprocal Buying

In addition to the power of the "deep pocket," conglomerate
mergers may also give rise to the power to engage in reciprocal
buying. Reciprocal buying involves an arrangement between two
firms that each will buy the products of the other. Conglomerates,
by virtue of their large volume of purchasing, may be able to pressure other companies into reciprocal buying arrangements by
threatening to cease purchasing the other companies' products. 88
The existence of this power also may be proved by postacquisition
evidence. In FTC v. ConsolidatedFoods Corp.,s" a company owning a network of wholesale and retail food stores acquired a manufacturer whose products, dehydrated onion and garlic, were sold to
food processors. The acquiring company purchased substantial
quantities of the food processors' end product.85 The Federal
Trade Commission found that the parent company had reciprocal
buying power, had demonstrated a willingness to exploit it, and
had used it to create a protected market for the acquired company.86 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, noted that
the acquired company had experienced only a seven per cent market share increase in dehydrated onions, and a twelve per cent
market share decrease in dehydrated garlic. In examining these
factors, the court interpreted the company's attempts at establishing reciprocal buying arrangements as unsuccessful.5 2
dence, including postacquisition evidence, demonstrated that it did not have the power to
succeed, the branding program did not provide a basis for a § 7 violation. Id. at 1714.
83. The essence of [a reciprocal buying arrangement] is the willingness of each company to buy from the other, conditioned upon the expectation that the other company will make reciprocal purchases. . . Where such a relationship is well established, it prevents the competitors of each company from selling to the other
company, and affords to each company whatever increase of size and strength can
be derived from an assured place as supplier to the other.
Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in NAT. BUR. Eco. RESEARCH,
BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 331, 342 (1955), cited in Consolidated Foods

Corp. v. FTC, 380 U.S. 594 (1965). See generally L.
ANTITRUST §§ 170-71 (1977); 16B J. VON KALINOWSKI,

SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULA-

§ 1902[12] (6th ed. 1979); Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77
HAnv. L. REv. 873 (1964); Lorie and Halpern, Conglomerates: The Rhetoric and the Evidence, 13 J.L. & ECON. 149 (1970).
84. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
85. Id. at 595.
86. Id. at 599.
87. Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S.
594 (1965). The court's view of the use of postacquisition evidence is reflected in its statement that "[p]robability can best be guaged by what the past has taught." Id. at 627. Accord, 380 U.S. 592, 606 (Stewart, J., concurring), discussed at notes 97-99 infra and text
TIONS

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, viewed this same evidence as an indication that reciprocity was repeatedly attempted and was sometimes successful."
This evidence, together with the peculiar structure of the industry,8 9 was held sufficient to support a finding of probability of reciprocal buying. The Court reversed the circuit court's decision for
relying too heavily upon postacquisition evidence. 90
It is noteworthy that Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion,9 1 argued that because it is the best evidence available, the
weight of postacquisition evidence should not be limited. He maintained that the true error of the court of appeals was its interpretation of the postacquisition evidence. Stewart interpreted the
postacquisition evidence as a demonstration that although the defendant's attempts at reciprocal buying met with mixed results,
they were successful when directed toward the smaller processors
in the industry. Stewart found this point dispositive of the
probability of anticompetitive effect. He indicated that neither the
opportunity for reciprocity alone nor the mere effort at reciprocity
could support a finding of probable anticompetitive effect. 9" Stewart urged the development of a standard for determining exactly
how effective reciprocity attempts must be in order to trigger a
finding of probability of anticompetitive effect. 9s Although onlythe
Commission and Justice Stewart directly adressed the questions of
power and its exercise, each opinion ultimately turned on an evaluation of the postacquisition evidence as it reflected the defendant's
power and intent to establish anticompetitive reciprocity
arrangements.

accompanying. See generally, Withered, Reciprocity, Monopsony Power, and Section 7, 25
ANTITRUST BULL. 217 (1980).

88.

FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 600 (1965).

89. It was a two-firm oligopoly. The acquired company was second to the leader, trailed
by a distant third competitor. Moreover, many customers found it best to use two suppliers
to protect their source of supply. Id.
90. Id. at 598. Although the Supreme Court also accorded substantial weight to the postacquisition evidence to support a finding of probable anticompetitive impact, the considerations involved in that type of application are quite different. See text accompanying notes
19-29 supra.
91.

Id. at 602 (Stewart, J., concurring).

92. "[It is not enough to say that the merger is illegal merely because reciprocity attempts 'sometimes worked.'" Id. at 604 (Stewart, J., concurring).
93.

Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Horizontal Mergers

In In re Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York 9" the respondent, a
producer of fine wine, acquired a producer of sweet wine. Market
shares and concentration ratios resulting from this horizontal
merger were too small to provide a basis for a section 7 violation. 95
The Federal Trade Commission contended, however, that as a result of the merger, the acquiring company could condition the distribution of its fine wine upon acceptance of the sweet wine."
Thus, there was a probability that the merger would result in the
foreclosure of competitors from business with the acquiring company's distributors. The respondent countered this argument by
pointing to the failure of its postacquisition attempt to consolidate
the sales organizations for the two products, and its subsequent reseparation of the sales organizations. 97 In deciding the case, the
Commission recognized that consolidation of sales was readily
within the control of the respondent, and that the failure of past
efforts to consolidate did not necessarily mean that further attempts would not be made." The evidence as a whole, however,
including the strength of the acquired concern's competitors, was
found to indicate no probability of anti-competitive effect. 99 Although the Commission did not expressly acknowledge it, postacquisition evidence appears to have confirmed its conclusion that
the respondent did not have power to foreclose.
Other postacquisition evidence in Coca-Cola received greater
recognition. The Commission argued that the acquisition would
have an anticompetitive effect because the respondent was trying
to change the image of the acquired concern in order to achieve
acceptance of its product as a table wine, and to raise prices. 0 0

94. 93 F.T.C. 110 (1979).
95. Id. at 206. The Commission further discounted the significance of the figures to take
account of postacquisition losses which were so calamitous as to negate any inference that
they were the result of manipulation by the respondent. Id.
96. Id. at 208.
97. Id. at 209.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 209.
100. Id. at 209. The Commission compared this attempt with the branding program in
United Brands, 83 F.T.C. 1614 (1974). See note 82 supra. The postacquisition attempt to
change the image of the acquired wine in order to achieve acceptance as a table wine could
have signficance to other aspects of the case. Defense counsel had argued that the two wines
were so different in quality and use that the sweet wine would not compete with the acquiring company's table wine. Although the Commission nevertheless characterized the merger
as horizontal, this asserted difference in the products was important to the ultimate deci-
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This effort, however, encountered an unfavorable market response,
and in fact resulted in diminished purchases and huge losses. 101
The Commission, without indicating any other basis for its conclusion, found the record insufficient to indicate that the respondent
would succeed in its attempt "to sell old wine in new bottles at a
higher price." 102 Thus, it seems that the question of power was determined, in the absence of contrary indications, by postacquisition evidence that the respondents' arguably anticompetitive attempts had failed.
Another example of effective defensive use of postacquisition evidence relevant to horizontal mergers is found in United States v.
International Harvester Co. 1a0 Postacquisition evidence in this
case showed that the acquiring company had taken steps to limit
its power to control the acquired company. The original stock
purchase agreement gave the respondent a 39% interest in the acquired company. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, those
holdings were reduced to 36%.1" Furthermore, a provision effectively giving the acquiring company veto power over certain corporate decisions was deleted from the agreement.105 The evidence
also showed that the acquiring company had not interfered with
the business activities of the acquired concern. 106 Thus, postacquisition evidence showed not only that the defendant's power to control the acquired company was limited, but also that the defendant
intended to limit that power.107
sion. In discussing the effect of the merger on competition, the Commission stated:
In a concentrated industry, even the loss of such a small competitor is to be prevented. Here, however, we cannot conclude that either Franzia or Mogen David
has been "lost" to the industry in any practical sense, because the extremely disparate nature of their product lines ensures that it is in Coke-New York's long
term economic interest that both continue to compete vigorously in the sale of the
line of products in which each specializes.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York, 93 F.T.C. 110, 207 (1979). This treatment can be contrasted with a different attitude expressed in United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441 (1964). See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
101. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York, 93 F.T.C. 110, 209 (1979).
102. Id. at 210. Thus, the Commission avoided the question of whether that conduct
would be considered anticompetitive.
103. 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
104. Id. at 776. The Court said that the parent company's holdings would be further
reduced to 33-1/3 %. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 777.
107. Postacquisition evidence also showed that both companies experienced increased
market shares and became stronger competitors. In addition there was active price competition between the two. Id. at 778.

19811

Postacquisition Evidence

In affirming the district court's decision upholding the merger,
the court of appeals found that postacquisition evidence had not
been given too much weight. Much of the postacquisition evidence
was beyond the power of the parties to manipulate and depicted
only part of the overall scene. 08 This case also reveals that postacquisition moves by a defendant limiting the defendant's anticompetitive power can be an effective defensive measure when it is
not within the defendant's power to reverse the limitation.
Evaluating Market Changes
Another type of postacquisition evidence that has been effective
is evidence showing changes in the operation of the market. In
United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,109 for instance, the increasing dominance of long-term contracts in the coal industry, together with the depletion of the acquired's uncommitted coal reserve position, made past performance statistics an unreliable
indicator of the future performance of the merged company.11 0
These past performance statistics would otherwise have been conclusive evidence of probable anticompetitive effect. Instead, the
postacquisition evidence of market changes was controlling in the
Supreme Court's decision that the merger did not violate section 7.
Subsequent cases have also relied upon postacquisition
evidence
of market changes. In United States v. Healthco Inc.,"" the government challenged the vertical merger of a dental products manufacturer and a dental products distributor. The defendant relied on
General Dynamics, arguing that the increasing importance of mail
order sales and direct sales in the dental products industry after
the merger diminished the significance of sales by dental dealers.
Therefore, the defendant argued, any foreclosure caused by the
Other postacquisition evidence reflecting limits voluntarily put on the acquiring company's control of the acquired company, such as maintenance of separate profit centers, has
been discounted as within the control of the defendant. See Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 89 F.T.C.
557 (1977) remanded, 589 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1979); Liggett & Myers Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1074
(1976) aff'd, 567 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1977). Cf. United States v. Sybron Corp., 329 F. Supp.
919 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (defendant presented a strong argument that traditional foreclosure
principles did not apply, but the district court was not persuaded). On separate profit centers in the conglomerate context, see generally Geneen, Concepts of a Conglomerate or a
Multi-Market Company: A Businessman's View, 39 A
rimusT L.J. 4, 13 (1969).
108. 564 F.2d at 780. More precisely, the evidence was not outside the power of the
defendant at the time of the changes; after the fact, however, the contractual provisions
were presumably permanent.
109. 415 U.S. 486 (1974). See notes 30-42 supra and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 504-506.
111. 387 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1243 (1975).
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merger would be insignificant. The evidence, however, provided
scant support for the defendant's position that the business relationship between manufacturers and dealers in dental products
had become less important to distribution. The court found this
change in the market to be speculative, and thus insufficient to
warrant upholding an otherwise anticompetitive merger.112
A similar presentation of postacquisition evidence showing market alteration was more successful in United States v. Hammermill Paper Co.118 There the court agreed with the defendant that
paper merchants were of declining significance to the distribution
of paper products. The court based its opinion on the gradual decline in the percentage of the market served by distributors from
60% at the time of the merger to 40% at the time of suit.1" This
evidence provided one of several bases for the court's finding that
significant foreclosure was not a probable result of the vertical
merger at issue.115
Similarly, the peculiar facts of Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC 6e compelled heavy reliance upon the defendant's postacquisition evidence of market changes. The Federal Trade Commission initially
found that the acquisition of an auto parts supplier by a manufacturer of various auto devices, including trailer anti-skid devices,
would probably foreclose other manufacturers from access to the
acquired company's supplies. Between the time of. the Commission's finding and the court of appeals' decision, however, the legal
requirement that trailers be equipped with anti-skid devices was
removed. 117 The court of appeals found that the change in the law

stripped the market of its viability, thereby rendering unsupportable the Commission's finding that the merger would anticompetitively effect the market for anti-skid devices.'
In RSR Corp. v. FTC," 9 postacquisition evidence was used to
establish both the product and the geographic markets. The court
looked at evidence that the acquiring company's plant in Newark,
112. Id. at 273.
113. 429 F. Supp. 1271 (W.D. Pa. 1977). See also notes 62-64 supra and accompanying
text for a discussion of other aspects of the case.
114. Id. at 1286. Cf. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal.
1967) (paper merchants, at the time of that suit, were significant in the market). For further
comparison of the cases, see 429 F. Supp. at 1287.)
115. 429 F. Supp. at 1293-94.
116. 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).
117. Id. at 355.
118. Id.
119. 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
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New Jersey was not replaced according to earlier plans because the
acquired company's plant in Walkill, New York could serve the
same market. This evidence justified including the Walkill, New
York region in a determination of the relevant geographic
120
market.
The product market in RSR Corp. was also in dispute. The defendant contended that it included both primary and secondary
lead, arguing that the data on competing uses did not account for
recent developments in the industry. Specifically, the defendant
argued that the increased use of maintenance-free batteries, which
can be made with either primary or secondary lead, was increasing
competition between primary and secondary lead producers. 12 ' The
court first noted the traditional limitation on the weight of postacquisition evidence. 122 It then found that the future of maintenancefree batteries was too speculative to carry weight in evaluating the
2 8
probable anticompetitive effect of the merger.
CONCLUSION

Postacquisition evidence offered by a party challenging a merger
has long been recognized as effective in prosecuting a violation of
section 7 of the Clayton Act. Defensive use of postacquisition evidence has, however, been viewed with distrust. Although the apparent unfairness of this dichotomy has generated criticism, the
difference in treatment is generally justified by the problems underlying defensive use of postacquisition evidence. It is beyond
doubt that postacquisition evidence showing that a merger has not
yet had an anticompetitive effect is unreliable. Such evidence cannot justify validating a merger because section 7 guards not only
against actual anticompetitive impact, but also against probable

120. Id. at 1322-23.
121. Id. at 1322.
122. Id. It is questionable, however, whether this postacquisition evidence presents
problems. It is clearly outside the defendant's control and is directly probative of the issue
concerning the area of competition. In addition, since the evidence doesn't bear on anticompetitive effects it need not be compared to any other time frame. Likewise, relying on this
evidence will not frustrate the "incipiency" policies of § 7. Finally, the evidence has no
tendency to make the merger appear either more or less dangerous.
See Warner-Lambert Co., 87 F.T.C. 812 (1976). In that case the government tried to use
postacquisition evidence to establish sufficient competition between the merged entities to
support a determination of relevant product market. The evidence did not support the contention. Even considering postacquisition inventions in the product market, the quantities
were, as yet, de minimus. Id. at 895.
123. 602 F.2d at 1322.
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future anticompetitive effect of the merger.
Postacquisition evidence can nevertheless be an effective defensive tool in certain situations. It may be relied upon when it
reveals changes in the operation of the market or disproves a defendant's anticompetitive power. Furthermore, postacquisition evidence reflecting a defendant's unwillingness to exercise its anticompetitive power may bolster its defense. As a result, merging
companies may reduce their exposure to a section 7. challenge by
structurally limiting their anticompetitive power.
Nevertheless, even evidence purportedly disproving a defendant's anticompetitive power must be carefully evaluated. As illustrated in Consolidated Foods, this type of evidence is susceptible
to misinterpretation. There is also a danger that postacquisition
evidence relevant to whether a defendant has anticompetitive
power will be used to improperly infer that there has been no actual anticompetitive effect. Therefore, although postacquisition evidence can be an effective defensive tool in certain situations, the
traditional limitation on the weight of that evidence retains its

vitality.
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